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Recent Cases
LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS-FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT,
SUSPENSION OF THE ACCRUAL OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION
Kokout v. Adlr'
Piper, a notary, forged plaintiff's name to a deed of trust on plaintiff's
property and six accompanying promissory notes. One note was for $5,000 payable
in three years, while the other five were semi-annual principal notes for $250.
The notary acknowledged the deed of trust in his capacity as notary public,
and then sold the instruments to Mrs. Vandas, to whom he was a trusted business
advisor. For the next three years, the notary paid the holder the interest in-
stallments and the semi-annual principal notes, claiming to be collecting the
money from the alleged makers for remittance. When the $5,000 note became
due in 1955, the notary told the holder that the makers wished to extend the
due date on the notes another three years, to which the holder agreed. Thereupon,
the notary forged a renewal agreement and new semi-annual notes. In 1958 the
holder and the alleged makers discovered the fraud. The alleged makers brought
an action to set aside the forged deed of trust as a cloud on title, naming the
holder and the notary as defendants. The question on appeal resulted from the
holder's cross-action against the surety on the notary's bond. The surety's motion
to dismiss, on the ground that the special statute of limitations2 had barred the
cause of action, was granted. On appeal, held, affirmed.
Piper not only committed a fraud on the holder, but also deliberately con-
cealed his fraud for six years by making interest payments and payment of the
semi-annual principal notes. The question is whether such fraudulent concealment
suspended the accrual of the cause of action on the notary's bond until the
forgery was discovered.
Prior to 1833 there was no statute of limitations in England applicable to
proceedings in equity. Though the statutes existing prior to 1833 bound courts
of law, they did not bind courts of equity in proceedings solely cognizable therein.
Equity adopted an analogous period as a rule to assist it in the exercise of its
discretion, but did not apply the statute when, because of fraud, the petitioner
did not know he had a cause of action.3
It is probable that the English cases formed the basis of the early doctrine
1. 327 S.W.2d 492 (St. L. Ct. App. 1959).
2. § 486.050, RSMo 1949, first provides for the bond and continues, "but
no suit shall be instituted against any such notary or his sureties more than three
years after such cause of action accrued."
3. See Rogers v. Brown, 61 Mo. 187 (1875).
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in this country that the statute of limitations did not deprive equity courts of
their discretion.4 There was near unanimity among courts of equity that the
statute would not bar relief where there was fraud plus concealment, but only
a bare majority held that the statute would not bar relief when there was only
fraud without active concealment. The theory of this bare majority of courts
was that fraud concealed itself.5 There was a decided conflict in the United States
as to whether courts of law would apply either of the equitable rules.,
The equitable rules as to fraud and fraud and concealment have been codified
in Missouri by Sections 516.120 and 516.280, Revised Statutes of Missouri (1949),
in the general sections of the chapter on statutes of limitation. If the principal
case had been decided under either of these sections 7 the action against the
defrauding notary would not have been barred. The question here was first whether
the saving grace of section 516.280, codifying the equitable rule as to fraud plus
concealment, was applicable to the special statute of limitations on notaries'
bonds, section 486.050,8 and this turned on the proper interpretation of Section
516.300, Revised Statutes of Missouri (1949), which provides:
The provisions of sections 516.010 to 516.370 shall not extend to any
action which is or shall be otherwise limited by any statute; but such
action shall be brought within the time limited by such statute.
The equitable rule as to fraud plus concealment had already been codified in
1807, by what is now section 516.280, twenty-eight years before the General
Assembly enacted what is now section 516.300 in 1835.9 By virtue of 516.300,
the legislature seems dearly to have exempted special statutes of limitation from
all of the general provisions of sections 516.010 to 516.370, including, of course,
516.280. But even if the saving grace of section 516.280 is not applicable to the
special statute of limitations on notaries' bonds, was it the intention of the General
Assembly in enacting section 516.300 to disable a court from applying the common
law equitable doctrine that tolled the running of a statute of limitation where
there was fraud and concealment?
The question of interpretation of the statute of limitations on a notary's bond
first came before the Kansas City Court of Appeals in State ex Tel. Barringer v.
4. 2 WooD, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS § 275 (1893).
5. Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342, 347 (1874).
6. 2 WooD, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS § 274 (1893); ANGELL, LIMITATIONS
OF ACTIONS § 185 (1869).
7. § 516.280, RSMo 1949: "If any person, by absconding or concealing
himself, or by any other improper act, prevent the commencement of an action,
such action may be commenced within the time herein limited, after the commence-
ment of such action shall have ceased to be so prevented."
§ 516.120, RSMo 1949: "Within five years . . . (5) An action for relief
on the ground of fraud, the cause of action in such case to be deemed not to
have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party, at any time within ten
years, of the facts constituting the fraud."
8. See note 2 supra.
9. The substance of what is now § 516.280, RSMo 1949, was first enacted
in 1807, 1 Terr. Laws, C. 42, § 4, at 145. What is now § 516.300 was enacted
in 1835, § 10, at 396, RSMo 1835. What is now § 516.120, RSMo 1949, was first
enacted in 1849, Mo. Laws 1849, at 74, § 4.
1961]
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Hawkins,'0 on facts which paralleled those of the principal case. The court
decided that the words "after such cause of action accrued,"1 left an area for
judicial interpretation, distinguishing the case from previous decisions construing
special statutes of limitation having no such clause. The court further reasoned
that since statutes of limitation were for the protection of defendants from the
practice of plaintiffs' delaying the bringing of their action until the defendant
could no longer prove his defense, it would be unjust to allow the defendant to
assert this protection when he -himself had concealed knowledge of the fraud
from the defrauded party. Accordingly, the court held that the cause of action
did not accrue until the defrauded party had, or by reasonable diligence could
have, discovered the fraud.
In State ex rel. O'Malley v. Musick,12 which was first appealed to the Spring-
field Court of Appeals, the court found fraud, but no concealed fraud. Since the
court could find no interpretive aid in the statute, it turned to the common law.
The court there found two lines of authority, one holding that fraud itself would
delay the commencing of the running of the statute, the other requiring concealed
fraud. Believing that to hold with the first line of authority would virtually
nullify the statute, the court adopted the view that concealed fraud was required.
The statement that concealed fraud delayed the accrual of the cause of action was
only dictum under the facts, but it represented a clear choice between alternatives.
A single notary perpetrated frauds which brought State ex rel. Haitz v.
American Surety Co.13 and State ex rel. Meinholtz v. Arerican Surety Co. 14 to
the St. Louis Court of Appeals. The notary sold two forged notes to the first
holder, who, when they became due, turned them in for collection. The notary
then indorsed an extension of time on the forged instruments and sold one of
them to Haitz and one to Meinholtz, remitting the proceeds thus obtained to
the first purchasers. Haitz learned of the fraud shortly thereafter and brought
suit within three years after the notes had been indorsed to him. It does not
appear from the reports when the Meinlholtz case was commenced, but the decision
of the St. Louis Court of Appeals was handed down three years after the decision
in the Haitz case. In both cases the plaintiff prevailed. In the Meinholtz case
the court stated:
The cause of action accrued when relator discovered the fraud, or when
by proper diligence an ordinarily prudent man could, under the circum-
stances, have discovered it .... 15
The court in the Kolzout case distinguished the Haitz case on the ground
that Haitz's cause of action did not accrue until the notes were indorsed to him.
10. 103 Mo. App. 251, 77 S.W. 98 (K.C. Ct. App. 1903).
11. § 486.050, RSMo 1949.
12. 145 Mo. App. 33, 130 S.W. 398 (Spr. Ct. App. 1910), quashed (for
lack of jurisdiction), State ex rel. O'Malley v. Nixon, 233 Mo. 345, 138 S.W. 342
(1911) (en banc). The opinion of the Springfield Court of Appeals was adopted
by the St. Louis Court of Appeals in State ex rel. O'Malley v. Musick, 165 Mo.
App. 214, 145 S.W. 1184 (St. L. Ct. App. 1912).
13. 203 Mo. App. 71, 217 S.W. 317 (St. L. Ct. App. 1920).
14. 254 S.W. 561 (St. L. Ct. App. 1923).
15. Id. at 564.
[Vol. 26
3
et al.: Recent Cases
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1961
RECENT CASES
The Meinkoltz case was also distinguished on this point despite the fact that it
does not appear from the reports when the action was commenced.
In the only case on this point that has come before the Supreme Court
there was only a fraudulent acknowledgment with no subsequent concealment.'0
The court followed the O'Malley case and others in holding that the statute had
run. They distinguished cases where the facts proved fraudulent concealment,
but made no comment thereon.
In earlier cases involving other special statutes of limitation, the Supreme
Court was apparently influenced by the equity rule recognizing discretion in
the court despite the existence of a definite statutory limitation period. In Shelby
County v. Bragg7 it was said by way of dictum:
E . . UIt is well settled in this state, whether by force of the statute or
independent of it, that fraudulent concealment of a cause of action will
delay the operation of the statute of limitation until after discovery of the
fraud.1 8
But more recent cases have held that a special statute will run irrespective of
concealment.1o In State ex rel. Bier v. Bigger-0 the court said:
[Wlhere a statute of limitations is a special one, not included in
the general chapter on limitations, the running thereof cannot be tolled
because of fraud, concealment or any other reason not provided in the
statute itself.21
This statement has been repeated in two recent decisions.22
Cases from other jurisdictions furnish little authority because of the peculiar
interrelation of Missouri statutes. Oklahoma's statute of limitations on a notary's
bond is worded the same as that of Missouri, and the supreme court of that
state has stated, in dictum, that fraudulent concealment is an implied exception
to the statute.28 An old Kansas decision held that fraud alone would not toll
the running of a similar statute.24
The Kokcnt case is directly contrary to the Barringer2 case and a wealth
of dictum of courts of appeals construing the statute in question. However, the
court probably correctly divined the law that the Missouri Supreme Court would
apply if the question were to come before it at the present time. The broad
16. State ex rel. State Life Ins. Co. v. Faucett, 163 S.W.2d 592 (Mo. 1942).
17. 135 Mo. 291, 36 S.W. 600 (1896) (failure to report to county amount
received in capacity as county clerk).
18. Id. at 298, 36 S.W. at 601.
19. Kober v. Kober, 324 Mo. 379, 23 S.W.2d 149 (1929) (statute limiting
dower rights).
20. 352 Mo. 502, 178 S.W.2d 347 (1944) (en banc) (limitation on bringing
wills to probate).
21. Id. at 510, 178 S.W.2d at 350.
22. Gilliam v. Gohn, 303 S.W.2d 101 (Mo. 1957) (limitation for contesting
tax deeds); Frazee v. Partney, 314 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1958) (wrongful death).
23. Oklahoma Farm Mortgage Co. v. Jordan, 67 Okla. 69, 168 Pac. 1029
(1917).
24. Bartlett v. Bullene, 23 Kan. 606 (1880).
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statements of the Supreme Court, made in several recent decisions such as the
Bier case, furnish strong authority.28 Frazee v. Partney,2 1 where the court allowed
the statute of limitations to run against one who left the scene of an accident,
and who was not discovered until a year later, is representative of the harshness
of such decisions. However, the last clause of Section 516.300, Revised Statutes
of Missouri (1949),28 gives credence to the assertion that such an interpretation
is the correct one. The situation is one which calls for legislative correction.
FRED D. BOLLOW
PARTNERSHIP-MISSOURI-RECOVERY IN QUANTUM MERUIT
AFTER BREACH OF PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT
White v. Lemley'
Plaintiff brought this action to recover for the reasonable value of services
rendered to defendant in pursuance of an agreement whereby defendant was to
furnish capital, and plaintiff his services, in a business project of erecting electric
transmission lines. Plaintiff was to have his expenses and, after such time as de-
fendant would be reimbursed for his capital expenditure, fifty per cent of the
profits. After plaintiff had obtained a number of contracts and they were fully per-
formed, disagreements arose which culminated in plaintiff's being relieved of his
duties through a court proceeding. Plaintiff alleged that defendant had agreed to
pay for the reasonable value of his services but failed to establish this at the trial.
The circuit court entered judgment for defendant. On appeal, held, affirmed. The
Supreme Court held that quantum meruit may not be maintained where no com-
pensation for services, other than a share of the net profits, was agreed upon by
the parties.
In an ordinary contract for services when one party prevents the other from
fully performing the contract two remedies are available. The injured party may
sue for damages for breach of contract, or in quantum meruit for the reasonable
value of the services rendered.2
However, in a partnership situation the general rule, long adhered to in this
country, is that a partner is not entitled to compensation for his services in con-
ducting the partnership business beyond his share of the profits.3 An exception to
26. State ex rel. Bier v. Bigger, 352 Mo. 502j 178 S.W.2d 347 (1944) (en
banc); Gilliam v. Gohn, 303 S.W.2d 101 (Mo. 1957); Frazee v. Partney, 314
S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1958).
27. 314 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1958).
28. ". . . but such action shall be brought within the time limited by
such statute."
1. 328 S.W.2d 694 (Mo. 1959).
2. Johnston v. Star Bucket Pump Co., 247 Mo. 414, 202 S.W. 1143 (1918)
(en banc); Roll v. Inglish, 220 Mo. App. 1077, 279 S.W. 769 (K.C. Ct. App. 1926);
Rodgers v. Levy, 199 S.W.2d 79 (St. L. Ct. App. 1947).
3. Denver v. Roane, 99 U.S. 355 (1878); Humphrey v. McClain, 219 Ky. 180,
292 S.W. 794 (1927).
[Vol. 26
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this rule occurs where there is a stipulation or agreement that he is to receive a
fixed amount for his services to the partnership.4
Missouri courts recognized the general rule as early as 1864 in the case of
Reily v. R-ussell,5 wherein it was stated that, absent an express agreement, no
charge for the value of services could be made by one partner against the other.6
A frequently cited Missouri case on the rule is Owsley v. Owsley7 where the
doctrine was reiterated and referred to as "a settled rule of law." In addition to its
case law Missouri has adopted the Uniform Partnership Law, thereby codifying
the previously recognized rule.8 It should also be noted that Missouri courts apply
the general rule to the joint venture.9 For this reason the court in the Lemley case
contented itself with saying that the parties' relationship was that either of part-
nership or joint venture, Without making any further refinement.
Some courts have recognized that, where there is an express or implied agree-
ment to pay for services rendered, and a defendant partner prevents a plaintiff co-
partner from performing, the agreement may be treated as rescinded and the
plaintiff can sue in quantum meruit for the reasonable value of his services.1° And
in the Lemley case the court noted that there was either an express or implied
agreement to pay for services rendered the partnership in the cases cited by the
plaintiff wherein recovery in quantum meruit was allowed against a partner."1
However, the court in Lemley found no agreement for compensation for services
other than an agreement to share in the net profits.
In view of the decision in Lemley, where recovery in quantum meruit was not
allowed, it may be of value to inquire as to the adequacy of the remedies which are
available to plaintiffs in a situation of this type. As Brannigan v. Schwabe12 indi-
cated, an adequate remedy is of special importance in actions between partners. In
Branniga the court noted that it is "well settled law" that a partner may exer-
cise his right to dissolve the partnership for any reason he may deem sufficient.13
What, then, are the possible theories upon which a plaintiff might recover in
a case of this kind? In Pemberton v. Ladue Realty & ConStr. Co.14 a substantially
similar situation arose where, in a joint enterprise providing for equal division of
4. Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 390 Pa. 39, 133 A.2d 829 (1957); see Annot., 66
A.L.R.2d 1023 (1957).
5. 34 Mo. 524 (1864).
6. Accord, Gaston v. Kellogg, 91 Mo. 104, 3 S.W. 589 (1887).
7. 34 S.W.2d 558, 560 (Spr. Ct. App. 1931).
S. § 358.180, RSMo 1949: "(6) No partner is entitled to remuneration for
acting in the partnership business, except that a surviving partner is entitled to
reasonable compensation for his services in winding up the partnership affairs;
9. Gales v. Weldon, 282 S.W.2d 522 (Mo. 1955); Hobart-Lee Tie Co. v.
Grodsky, 329 Mo. 706, 46 S.W.2d 859 (1931).
10. Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, supra note 4.
11. Turney v. Baker, 103 Mo. App. 390, 77 S.W. 479 (K.C. Ct. App. 1903);
Rodgers v. Levy, supra note 2; Joern v. Bang, 200 S.W. 737 (St. L. Ct. App. 1918);
Bailey v. Interstate Airmotive, Inc., 358 Mo. 1121, 219 S.W.2d 333 (1949).
12. 133 S.W.2d 1053 (St. L. Ct. App. 1939).
13. See also Schneider v. Newmark, 224 S.W.2d 968 (Mo. 1949).
14. 180 S.W.2d 766 (St. L. Ct. App. 1944).
19611
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the profits, the defendant prevented the plaintiff from continuing under the agree-
ment and the plaintiff sued in quantum meruit.1" The court of appeals of St.
Louis held that in no event could the plaintiff sue in quantum meruit, but advanced
two other possible theories of recovery-an action at law for breach of the agree-
ment1 ' and, in equity, for an accounting for profits.17
An accounting is the usual remedy pursued and is a virtual condition precedent
to any action by a partner concerning claims on the partnership.18 But where a
partner prevents his co-partner from going ahead with an agreement at a time
where large profits are soon to be realized but few, if any, have yet accrued to the
partnership, an accounting might reveal that the injured party has little forthcom-
ing for his services.10 An action at law for damages for breach of contract would
likewise result in an inadequate remedy since the damages as to "expected" profits
would be difficult, if not impossible, to establish. Thus it appears that the possible
theories of recovery advanced by the court in Pemberton, in the face of their re-
fusal to allow recovery in quantum meruit, while they may be adequate in many
situations, are not adequate in situations like that in the principal case. Because
of this inadequacy of alternative remedies, it is submitted that a plaintiff's sub-
stantive rights are not protected by strict adherence to the rule disallowing re-
covery in quantum meruit for services rendered.
In the Lemley case the court has approached the problem as being one of
remedy, denying an action in quantum meruit and indicating that the proper
remedy would be either an action at law for breach of contract or in equity for an
accounting. But the substantive law, as regards plaintiff's right to compensation for
his services, was not dealt with by the court. Should not the courts limit remedies,
as they do here, only with full appreciation of the effect on the parties' substantive
rights?
DAviD L. KNIGHT
15. Fitts v. Mission Health & Beauty Shop, 58 Cal. App. 362, 208 Pac. 691
(Dist. Ct. App. 1922).
16. Bagley v. Smith, 10 N.Y. 489, 61 Am. Dec. 756 (1853).
17. Farwell v. Wilcox, 73 Okla. 230, 175 Pac. 936 (1918).
18. Koontz v. Whitaker, 111 S.W.2d 197 (K.C. Ct. App. 1937). However, this
case recognizes that a suit for damages for breach of contract may be sustained in
certain situations without an accounting where the partnership is limited in scope,
where only a few items remain to be settled, and where fraud, accident, or mistake
cause the exclusion of specific items from the accounting.
19. Of course, in some situations equity may formulate a decree which will
protect the plaintiff by giving him an accounting for profits earned subsequent to
dissolution. Bell v. McCoy, 136 Mo. 552, 38 S.W. 329 (1896). A receiver might be
appointed or the defendant named as trustee. Brannigan v. Schwabe, supra note 12.
The reasoning which allows plaintiffs a share of the future profits is based on the
retention and use of their capital investment in the firm after dissolution. How-
ever, in the situation here, the original contract calls for plaintiff's personal serv-
ices with little or no capital investment on his part, and an accounting in such a
situation would rarely allow a plaintiff any share of future profits. See, e.g., Steams
v. Blevins, 262 Mass. 577, 169 N.E. 417 (1928).
[Vol. 26
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Burger v. City of Springfield
0. L. Burger and the City of Springfield entered into a written contract
whereby Burger agreed to represent the city in negotiations for purchase of the
Springfield City Water Company, a public utility. A resolution passed by the city
council pursuant to the agency contract stated in part, ..... a reasonable compen-
sation for services and expenses to be fixed by the council upon the completion of
his services." For three years prior to Burger's employment, the city had tried
unsuccessfully to purchase the water company. At the time of Burger's employ-
ment, the water company was asking $23,900,000. Burger was authorized to pay
up to $19,500,000, but finally negotiated the purchase for $19,000,000. The city
purchased the water plant under the contract negotiated by Burger but refused to
pay him for his services, claiming that the contract was ultra vires, void and un-
enforceable under Section 432.070, Revised Statutes of Missouri (1949),2 which
requires municipal contracts to be in writing. The trial court dismissed Burger's
amended complaint, in two counts, on the ground that neither count stated facts
upon which relief could be granted because of the provision of section 432.070. On
appeal, held, reversed and remanded. There was a written contract composed of
the resolution, the notice of appointment and the formal acceptance, and it com-
plied with the. requirements of section 432.070, in that it stated a definite con-
sideration.
Section 432.070 provides in part:
No county, city, town, village . . . or other municipal corporation shall
make any contract . . . unless such contract be made upon a considera-
tion wholly to be performed or executed subsequent to the making of the
contract; and such contract, including the consideration shall be in writ-
ing ....
This section may appear fairly clear and simple in its terms, but as Professor
Corbin says, "the term consideration has been used by the courts in so broad and
variable a sense that no statute can be clear and easy of application, if it merely
requires a memorandum stating the consideration." s
The requirements of section 432.070 are mandatory, and not merely directory,
and any contract not complying with this section is ultra vires, void and unen-
forceable.4 Any contract made with a county,5 without express statutory authority,
1. 323 S.W.2d 777 (Mo. 1959).
2. All section references hereafter will be to Revised Statutes of Missouri(1949), unless otherwise noted.
3. 2 CORBIN, CoTRACTS § 503 (1950).
4. Donovan v. Kansas City, 352 Mo. 430, 175 S.W.2d 874 (1943) (en banc),
appeal dismissed, 322 U.S. 707 (1944).
5. It should be noted that section 432.070 draws no distinction between a
county, a city or a municipal corporation.
1961]
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and not complying with statutory requirements, is void, and the county is not
liable on a theory of ratification, estoppel, or implied contract,6 even though it
may have received the benefit of performance by the other party to the contract.7
One dealing with a municipal corporation or county is bound to know the extent
of its authority and the limitations on its power.8
Section 432.070 was first enacted in 1874.9 It was considered by the Missouri
Supreme Court for the first time in Woolfolk v. Randolph County,'0 the court
holding that the section required the consideration to be ascertained in rate or
amount and stated in terms of dollars and cents in the contract. However, in the
Woolfolk case, the parties conceded there was no written contract, and it seems
that recovery should have been barred on this basis."
The rule of the Woolfolk case interpreting section 432.070 to require that con.-
sideration be stated in rate or amount was the avowed basis for the Supreme
Court's decision in Bride v. City of Slater,"2 which arose 69 years later. In the
principal case the court did not overrule the Bride case, but rather distinguished
it on its facts.' 3 The court said that in the Bride case the consideration was to be
determined by the seller, whereas in the principal case the consideration was to be
determined by the city council. By so distinguishing these two cases the court
reaffirmed a previously weak and questionable decision, the basis for which the
court had earlier destroyed.'4 The court is not inconsistent in distinguishing the
cases, but the doctrines of the cases are inconsistent in that the Bride case requires
the consideration to be stated in dollars and cents, while the principal case re-
quires only "reasonable compensation."
There is some basis in other authorities for the decision in the principal case.
Professor Corbin for one draws a distinction between the consideration for the
6. Bride v. City of Slater, 263 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. 1953); Elkins-Swyers Office
Equip. Co. v. Moniteau County, 357 Mo. 448, 209 S.W.2d 127 (1948); Kansas
City v. Rathford, 353 Mo. 1130, 186 S.W.2d 570 (1945); Donovan v. Kansas City,
supra note 4; Likes v. City of Rolla, 184 Mo. App. 296, 167 S.W. 645 (Spr. Ct.
App. 1914).
7. Central Transp. Co. v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 139 U.S. 24 (1891);
Kansas City v. Rathford, supra note 6; Donovan v. Kansas City, supra note 4;
Riley v. City of Rock Port, 165 S.W.2d 880 (K.C. Ct. App. 1942); Likes v. City of
Rolla, supra note 6. See also Fleshner v. Kansas City, 348 Mo. 978, 156 S.W.2d
706 (1941), in which the court held that a contract which did not comply with
this section was void ab initio, and could not be given force by ratification.
8. Thomas v. City of Richmond, 79 U.S. 349 (1870); cases cited note 7
supra.
9. Mo. Laws 1874, at 44, § 1.
10. 83 Mo. 501 (1884).
11. Recovery was barred in this case supposedly on the basis that the con-
sideration was not stated in the contract as required by § 5360, RSMo 1879.
12. 263 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. 1953).
13. In Bride v. City of Slater, supra note 12, Bride had contracted to supply
fuel oil to the city of Slater, the price being stated as the "seller's market price on
date of shipment." There was a written contract, 'but the court refused recovery,
stating that the contract did not comply with section 432.070 in that it failed to
adequately set out the consideration.
14. See Dahm, Contracts-By Municipality-Cosideration--Seller's Market
Price at Time of Delivery, 20 Mo. L. REv. 316 (1955).
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contract, and the price to be paid. 5 He says one can state consideration for a con-
tract without stating the actual price of the goods covered by the contract. This
distinction has been recognized by a United States circuit court of appeals in
Reid v. Diamond Plate-Glass Co.16
The English Statute of Frauds prior to 1856 was interpreted as requiring the
entire contract of the parties to be in writing, including the consideration.' 7 In
Hoadly v. M'Laine,'8 decided in 1834, it was held that the implication of "reasona-
ble compensation" by law satisfied this requirement. There suit was brought on a
written contract for the sale of a landaulet, which contract came within the
Statute of Frauds. The contract was silent as to the price to be paid. The English
court held that the parties need not state in the writing any terms or conditions
implied in law, and that if no other price was agreed upon and stated, it was im-
plied in law that reasonable compensation was agreed to and became a part of the
contract as though it were specifically written into the contract, and that there-
fore the contract met the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. A fortiori, if
the courts will imply in law the term "reasonable compensation" to meet the re-
quirement that the consideration must be stated, where the parties specifically
agree to, and write "reasonable compensation" into their contract, they have com-
plied with a statute which specifically requires the consideration to be stated.
And in Burlington Grocery Co. v. Lines,'9 decided under a statute which re-
quired the consideration to be stated in the writing, it was held sufficient that the
memorandum stated a price not in excess of a certain sum. The court declared that
this was in effect a stipulation for a reasonable price to be determined, but in any
event not to be more than the maximum named.
It seems clear that under the Missouri statute, parol evidence cannot be
used to prove what consideration was agreed upon where there is no expression
relating to the price. Where there is an expression relating to the price which re-
quires defining or explaining, it has been held, under a similar statute, that parol
evidence may be received by the court to define or explain such term.20
Contracts made by a city, if authorized, are no different from other contracts.
A contract is generally held to be sufficiently definite and certain and thus valid
and enforceable if a court can give it an exact meaning.21 Contracts of municipali-
15. 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 501 (1950).
16. 85 Fed. 193 (6th Cir. 1898).
17. 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 103 (rev. ed. 1948).
18. 10 Bing. 482 (1834).
19. 96 Vt. 405, 120 At. 169 (1923).
20. See Flash v. Rossiter, 116 App. Div. 880, 102 N.Y. Supp. 449 (1907).
21. Brown v. Childers, 254 S.W.2d 275 (K.C. Ct. App. 1953); Shofler v.
Jordan, 284 S.W.2d 612 (Spr. Ct. App. 1955); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 37 (3rd
ed. 1957); 12 AM. JUR. Contracts § 64 (1938). See also Bay v. Bedwell, 21 S.W.2d
203 (Spr. Ct. App. 1929); Hubbard v. Turner Dep't Store Co., 220 Mo. App. 95,
278 S.W. 1060 (Spr. Ct. App. 1926); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 32 (1932); 17
C.J.S. Contracts § 36 (1939).
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ties should be construed in the same manner.22
In Brunner v. Stix, Baer & Faler Co.,23 it was held that "reasonable value"
was sufficiently definite consideration to form a binding contract. There appears
to be no valid distinction between "reasonable value" and "reasonable compen-
sation." Since "reasonable value" has been held adequate to form a binding con-
tract between individuals, it seems apparent that where a written contract by a
municipality calls for "reasonable compensation," it should be held to comply
with section 432.070, both in letter and spirit. That is definite in law, and can be
made certain by ordinary canons of construction.24 Section 432.070 was enacted
to protect municipalities from extravagant and dishonest officials.25 To hold "rea-
sonable compensation" satisfies the statute does not defeat this purpose.
The court, in the Burger case, destroyed the Woolfolk case as authority for the
principle which it purported to lay down. The court stated that the construction of
the statute given in the Woolfolk case is not controlling because that case did not
involve a written contract. By so distinguishing these two cases, the court in
practical effect overruled the hitherto recognized basis of the Woolfolk case.
If the Bride case can be distinguished from the principal case on the aspect of
certainty, the principal case cannot be distinguished from the Woolfolk case on
that basis. Since the court has destroyed the Woolfolk case as authority, it should
also have overruled the Bride case insofar as it was based on the Woolfolk case.
CARL F. KRAuss
LEGAL PROFESSION-RESIGNATION FROM THE BAR
UNDER CHARGES
In re SyinsonL
In 1951, while disbarment proceedings were pending against him, petitioner
tendered his resignation from the Missouri Bar. It was accepted by the Supreme
Court, which concurrently entered an order of disbarment. On motion for recon-
sideration of a prior motion for reinstatement, filed in the Missouri Supreme Court
seven years later, the court overruled the motion, holding that a resignation under
such circumstances may be accepted upon such conditions as the courts may deem
proper.
That a solicitor may have his name stricken from the roll at his own request
22. Hollerbach v. United States, 233 U.S. 165 (1914); Atlanta Constr. Co. v.
State, 103 Misc. 233, 175 N.Y. Supp. 453 (Ct. Cl. 1918); Maney v. Oklahoma
City, 150 Okla. 77, 300 Pac. 642 (1931).
23. 352 Mo. 1225, 181 S.W.2d 643 (1944) (en banc).
24. Klaber v. Lahar, 63 S.W.2d 103 (Mo. 1933); Shofler v. Jordan, supra
note 21.
25. Likes v. City of Rolla, supra note 6.
1. 322 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. 1959) (en banc).
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has long been recognized in England.2 However, the name of a solicitor will not be
stricken from the rolls at his own request without an affidavit that no proceedings
are pending against him, and that he expects none.$ This rule is considered to be
based on the Statute of Westminster I, which gives the English courts the power
in disciplinary proceedings to imprison as well as disbar, strike from the rolls,
suspend or reprimand. The English courts are seemingly guided by the premise
that by allowing a solicitor to resign without the affidavit would deprive the
courts of the power to punish by imprisonment.5
In this country, as in England, an attorney who is not under charges may re-
sign from the bar and have his name stricken from the roU of attorneys at his own
request.6 The effect of the presence of charges on an attorney's ability to resign,
however, is not so clear in this country. But, in general, three approaches to the
problem of attorneys resigning from the bar while under charges are apparent in
the American decisions: (1) One approach by the courts is to allow resignation
from the 'bar under charges as a matter of course in most cases.7 (2) Secondly,
there is the approach that an attorney should not be allowed to resign from the
bar while charges are pending against him.8 (3) The last approach, 9 and that fol-
lowed in Iz re Sympson, is to leave with the discretion of the court whether to
accept a resignation and the circumstances and conditions to be imposed on such
resignation. 0
2. Ex parte Owen, 6 Ves. Jr. 11, 31 Eng. Rep. 913 (Ch. 1801). It would
seem that there is no such thing as a resignation eo nomine from the English Bar.
A barrister may be disbarred, either on his own petition or for disciplinary reasons,
by the benchers of the Inn of Court to which he belongs, subject to appeal to the
Lord Chancellor and the judges of the High Court of Justice. [3 HALSBURY, LAws
OF ENGLAND 5-6 (3rd ed. 1953).] Consequently the term "disbarment" does not
have a derogatory connotation in England.
3. Ex parte Foley, 8 Ves. Jr. 33, 32 Eng. Rep. 262 (Ch. 1802); Ex parte
Owen, slipra note 2; WEEKS, ArroRNEys AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 189 (2d ed.
1892).
4. 1275, 3 Edw. 1, c. 29; 2 COKE, INsTrruTEs OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 213
(1681). The statute appears to be applicable to both barristers and solicitors.
5. Application of Harper, 84 So.2d 700 (Fla. 1956).
6. Application of Harper, supra note 5; In re Lebangood, 308 Ky. 280, 213
S.W.2d 1011 (1948); In re Sympson, supra note 1; In re Quartin, 266 App. Div.
733, 40 N.Y.S.2d 718 (1943); In re Haddad, 106 Vt. 322, 173 AtI. 103 (1934);
PHILLIPS & McCoy, CoNDucr OF JUDGES AN) LAWYERS 122 (1952); see also Annot.,
54 A.L.R.2d 1272 (1957).
7. In re May, 239 S.W.2d 95 (Ky. Ct. App. 1951); In re Lebangood, supra
note 6; People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Reed, 341 Ill. 573, 173 N.E. 772 (1930);
In re Quartin, supra note 6; In the Matter of McGrath, 255 App. Div. 923, 7
N.Y.S.2d 978 (1938).
8. In re Lucas, 230 Ind. 254, 102 N.E.2d 909 (1952); Louisiana State Bar
Ass'n v. Pitcher, 238 La. 649, 116 So.2d 281 (1959); In re Harrington's Case, 100
N.H. 243, 123 A.2d 396 (1956); In re King, 165 Ore. 103, 105 P.2d 870 (1940); Ex
parte Thompson, 32 Ore. 499, 52 Pac. 570 (1898) In re Haddad, supra note 6.
9. It should be noted that these are merely the approaches these courts seem
to take in the reported decisions. When faced with a particular set of facts the
approach might vary.
10. Petersen v. State Bar of Cal., 21 Cal. 2d 866, 136 P.2d 561 (1943); State
ex rel. Florida Bar v. Englander, 118 So.2d 625 (Fla. 1960); In re Application of
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If one follows the doctrine set out in many of the decisions on disciplinary
proceedings, that the purpose of such proceeding is not to punish an attorney but
to guard the administration of justice, preserve the purity of the courts, and to
protect the public and the profession,11 then it might reasonably be inferred that
resignation accomplishes all these purposes. It is suggested that this philosophy
may well be the basis for the action of the courts of those states which allow
resignation from the bar under charges as a matter of course.12
The second group of courts' 3 seem to follow the theory that any attorney whose
conduct justifies disciplinary proceedings should be disbarred or suspended when
found guilty and that there should be no consideration of degrees of charged mis-
conduct in determining whether a resignation is possible. The impact of the English
rule may still be, to some extent, exerting an influence on these courts.
What then can be said for the rule, which Missouri follows, which leaves with
the court the discretion whether or not to accept a resignation under charges and
the conditions to be imposed upon such resignation from the bar?"4 It is suggested
that because a resignation from the bar does not necessarily connote misconduct
in the eyes of the public,15 many of the courts in this group will allow a resigna-
tion when the conduct of the attorney involved is not considered extremely serious.
But when there has been extremely serious misconduct, as determined by the
court, the courts are unwilling to allow resignation and instead disbar the attorney
because they feel that his misconduct justifies the moral condemnation of disbar-
ment,' 6 and that if the court should permit an attorney to escape with a light
sentence it tends to lessen the respect the public normally has for members of the
bar.' 7
Peel, 111 So.2d 452 (Fla. 1959); Application of Harper, supra note 5; In re Evers,
41 Wash. 2d 942, 247 P.2d 890 (1952); In the Matter of Lonergan, 23 Wash. 2d
767, 162 P.2d 289 (1945).
It may be noted that the rule relating to resignation from the military serv-
ices is roughly analogous to the rule followed by these courts as to resignation
from the bar. That is, the President has discretion as to whether to accept such
resignation. An unqualified acceptance of a resignation is an honorable discharge
from service, but where the acceptance is for the good of the service the discharge
is without honor. [DIG. Ops. JAG 816-817 (1912).]
11. In re Williams, 221 Minn. 554, 23 N.W.2d 4 (1946); In re Sympson, supra
note 1; In the Matter of Rich, 161 A.2d 488 (N.J. 1960); In the Matter of
Dougherty, 7 App. Div. 2d 163, 180 N.Y.S.2d 971 (1959); In re McKechnie, 214
Ore. 531, 330 P.2d 727 (1958).
12. Cases cited note 7 supra.
13. Cases cited note 8 supra.
14. Cases cited note 10 supra.
15. Gresham v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. App. 2d 664, 112 P.2d 965 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1941).
16. In State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Englander, supra note 10, an attorney found
guilty in a disciplinary proceeding of obtaining money under false pretenses was
not allowed to resign because the purity of the courts would be adversely affected.
In Application of Harper, supra note 5, an attorney, when serious charges of pro-
fessional misconduct were pending against him, was allowed to resign when the
court found the public interest and the purity of the courts would not be adversely
affected.
17. Ex parte Thompson, supra note 8.
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The result reached in In re Sympson and in those courts which follow the dis-
cretionary approach to resignation from the bar under charges would seem desira-
ble. With this handling of the situation, every case is weighed individually and the
court can reach the decision which more fully protects the purity of the courts,
the public, and the profession.
EARL S. MACKEY
HUMANITARIAN NEGLIGENCE-APPLICABILITY TO A MOTORIST
BLINDED BY APPROACHING HEADLIGHTS
Hampton v. Raines"-
A nighttime headon collision between two trailer-trucks occurred during a
fairly heavy fog on a straight stretch of a two-lane asphalt road. Defendant Ellis
testified that when he was five hundred feet from plaintiff Hampton's approaching
truck, he was completely blinded by its headlights. He began blinking his lights,
reduced his speed from 30 to 35 miles per hour to 20 miles per hour, and tried to
hold the wheel straight, but apparently his vehicle "wandered" onto the wrong
side of the road. Plaintiff Hampton stated that he was driving at 30 to 35 miles
per hour when he saw the lights of the defendant's truck coming into his lane at a
distance of about four or five hundred feet ahead. He pulled to the right as far
as he could and applied his brakes, leaving skid marks of one hundred and forty-
five feet, but did not avert collision.
Undoubtedly if plaintiff failed to dim his headlights, he was guilty of negli-
gence per se.2 However defendant did not counterclaim on primary negligence, the
theory proceeded upon in all previous Missouri cases involving the "blinding" lights
situation.3 Indeed, he could not deny contributory negligence since by the fact
of glaring lights he was not absolved of his duty to keep his vehicle on the right
side of the road.4 Instead, the defendant's counterclaim was submitted upon the
unique theory that plaintiff's failure to cease blinding constituted humanitarian
negligence. The rationale was that defendant entered a position of imminent peril
by crossing over into the path of plaintiff's vehicle and that if plaintiff had dimmed
his lights in this crisis situation, defendant could have observed his position on the
road and returned to his own side in time to have prevented collision. The verdict
was in favor of defendant in the trial court. On appeal, held, reversed.
Since it is of no consequence that the humanitarian negligence is asserted by
1. 334 S.W.2d 372 (Spr. Ct. App. 1960).
2. § 304.370, RSMo 1949.
3. Beaver v. Wilhelm, 321 S.W.2d 1 (St. L. Ct. App. 1959); Fullerton v.
Kansas City, 236 S.W.2d 364 (K.C. Ct. App. 1950); Bedsaul v. Feeback, 341 Mo.
50, 106 S.W.2d 431 (1937); Powell v. Schofield, 223 Mo. App. 1041, 15 S.W.2d 876
(Spr. Ct. App. 1929); Snyder v. Murray, 223 Mo. App. 671, 17 S.W.2d 639 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1929).
4. § 304.020, RSMo 1949. See also Biggs v. Crosswhite, 240 Mo. App. 1171,
225 S.W.2d 514 (K.C. Ct. App. 1949).
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defendant in a counterclaim, 5 the parties to this action will be referred to below in
terms of plaintiff and defendant in their humanitarian sense so as to permit an
analysis corresponding to the outline of the elements of a humanitarian case as set
forth in Banks v. Morris & Co.6
It must first be established that plaintiff was in a position of imminent peril,
either from mental obliviousness or physical helplessness. The former is defined
in terms of awareness of the danger-a plaintiff, being negligently inattentive, is
not conscious of his peril. The latter is descriptive of the situation in which a
plaintiff is physically unable to extricate himself from his perilous situation.7
The court rejected the contention that plaintiff was oblivious stating: "He
may not have known which side of the road he was on, but he knew he was in
danger of collision, and he knew why he was in danger."8 But the court did not
undertake a discussion of the possibility of physical helplessness in spite of the
plaintiff's contention of complete blindness. If a driver were totally blinded (which
probably would be the allegation in every case), the situation could be likened
to one in which a blind man stands in the path of an approaching vehicle not know-
ing of those measures that will lead to his safety-a clear case of physical helpless-
ness. However it is the opinion of this writer that a motorist who gets onto the
wrong side of the road when confronted by glaring lights is not physically helpless
since he can by the exercise of the highest degree of care take steps in the crisis
situation to extricate himself from the peril. By glancing down to the right edge
of the road,0 a driver can maintain a continuous check on the position of his car
with reference to the center line, angling to the right if necessary, and at the same
time obviate the dazzling effect of the lights. Then the effect of the bright lights
will not be total blindness, but rather merely a temporary impairment of normal
vision, the driver still being able to discern, at least vaguely, the lights of the
approaching car and thereby to ascertain the position and direction of the vehicle
relative to his own.
With the added factor of fog making the problem a more difficult one, the
court chose to dispose of the case on the basis of the second element, that is, there
was no showing that defendant had notice, actual or constructive, of plaintiff's
danger. Plaintiff's traveling on the wrong side of the road did not give notice, for
5. Wabash R. Co. v. Dannen Mills, Inc., 288 S.W.2d 926 (Mo. 1956) (en
banc). Noted in Becker, The Missouri Humanitarian Doctrine-1956, 1957, 23 Mo.
L. REv. 420 (1958).
6. 302 Mo. 254, 257 S.W. 482 (1924) (en banc). This case lists the fol-
lowing elements: "(1) Plaintiff was in a position of peril; (2) defendant had
notice thereof (if it was the duty of defendant to have been on the lookout,
constructive notice suffices); (3) defendant after receiving such notice had the
present ability, with the means at hand, to have averted the impending injury
without injury to himself or others; (4) he failed to exercise ordinary care to
avert such impending injury; and (5) by reason thereof plaintiff was injured."
7. The situations are explained in McCleary, The Bases of the Humanitarian
Doctrine Reexamined, 5 Mo. L. REv. 56 (1940).
8. 334 S.W.2d at 375.
9. This procedure is recommended in Missouri Drivers Guide, at page 30,
the pamphlet issued by the licensing bureau to prospective drivers.
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defendant was entitled to assume that plaintiff would return to his proper lane.10
Nor did plaintiff's blinking his lights give defendant reason to suspect the con-
trary; a rule requiring defendant to act upon a message so frequently emitted in
nighttime travel would certainly be a harsh one. Even if there were a finding of
notice, the court suggests there would be a problem in finding the third element
of humanitarian negligence, namely, whether defendant had the present ability to
have averted the impending injury without injury to himself or others. Defendant
would have to react to the message and dim his lights in time for the plaintiff to
discover his position and turn aside-a time consuming chain of events requiring
the cooperative action of both parties.
There should be no doubts as to the propriety of the court's decision. Any
other conclusion would not only have permitted a plaintiff blameworthy in the
crisis to recover and have imposed an extreme duty of care upon defendant, but
also would have given rise to a new source of litigation, where a plaintiff seeks the
benefit of the humanitarian doctrine on a theory of being blinded by defendant's
headlights in a collision with the latter's automobile, to further hamper efficient
administration of justice by the already overcrowded courts.
JAMES J. MOLLENKAMP
CREDITORS' RIGHTS-VALIDITY OF MISSOURI IMMUNITY STATUTE
RELATING TO EXAMINATION OF JUDGMENT DEBTOR
State ex rel. North. v. Kirtley'
Relator, a judgment debtor, was brought before the court by his judgment
creditor for a statutory examination 2 pertaining to secretion of assets, and was
asked whether or not he owned certain property. A fraudulent conveyance being
a crime,3 the relator refused to answer, claiming the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination.4 The judge, respondent here, ruled the privilege did not apply,
and indicated an intent to commit the relator for contempt. To prevent this the
relator obtained issuance of an original writ of prohibition against the respondent
from the Missouri Supreme Court, which, after hearing, made the writ absolute.
At the hearing the respondent first contended that the privilege applied only
to criminal proceedings. This was rejected by the court, which said: "This state
has frequently recognized that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination
10. Moore v. Middlewest Freightways, Inc., 266 S.W.2d 578 (Mo. 1954);
Lemonds v. Holmes, 241 Mo. App. 463, 236 S.W.2d 56 (Spr. Ct. App. 1951).
1. 327 S.W.2d 166 (Mo. 1959) (en banc).
2. § 513.380, RSMo 1949: "Whenever an execution against the property of
any judgment debtor ... shall be returned unsatisfied ... the judgment creditor
in such execution ... may... be entitled to an order by the court.., requiring
the judgment debtor to appear before such court ...to undergo an examination
under oath touching his ability and means to satisfy said judgment. ....
3. § 561.550, RSMo 1949.
4. Mo. CONsT. art. I, § 19: "That no person shall be compelled to testify
against himself in a criminal cause ......
19611
16
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [1961], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol26/iss1/12
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
is available to a witness before any tribunal in any proceeding." 5
Respondent next contended that the relator was given statutory immunity,6
and therefore the privilege was not applicable. On this point the court held that
the statutory immunity granted was inadequate, and therefore the relator had
properly claimed the privilege against self-incrimination. In this connection the
court said:
Obviously, section 491.080 is not as broad as the constitutional guar-
anty. Two shortcomings readily appear. First, the only immunity offered
is that 'the testimony of such person shall not be used as evidence to prove
any fact in any suit or prosecution against such person.' This falls short of
rendering ineffectual the use of the witness' testimony as a means of dis-
covering independent evidence on which a prosecution could be based.
Secondly, the statute restricts the immunity to suits or prosecutions
'for any penalty for violation of any law in. relation to fraudulent convey-
ance of property! (Italics the court's.) There is no limitation upon the
use of the testimony of the witness as evidence in some other criminal
prosecution. Thus, it does not 'afford absolute immunity' as prescribed by
the decisions to which we adhere.
7
The privilege against self-incrimination, according to historians,8 resulted from
abuses in interrogation by the ecclesiastical courts and the Star Chamber. By 1700
it was considered "fundamental" in the common law that "in all proceedings civil
as well as criminal not only parties but witnesses as well are privileged against
compulsion to testify to facts subjecting them to punishment or forfeiture."9 Due
to similar abuses in colonial America, it was made a part of the bills of rights of
the federal constitution and all state constitutions ° except Iowa and New Jersey,
where, however, the privilege still exists. In Iowa"l it is part of the state constitu-
tional due process clause, and in New Jerseyl2 it is part of the common law.
To ferret out crime, particularly conspiracies, the practice began to grant
statutory immunity in exchange for compelled testimony, thus making the occa-
sion for asserting the privilege non-existent.13 These early statutes, such as the
one involved in the Northk case, granted immunity only against use of the testimony
as evidence in a subsequent criminal prosecution. This left the state officials free
to use the compelled testimony to gain independent evidence with which to con-
vict the person testifying of any crime that he divulged. This trap was closed to
5. 327 S.W.2d at 167.
6. § 491.080, RSMo 1949: "Whenever any person shall testify, either as a
party or as a witness, in any suit or proceedings now or hereafter pending, the
testimony of such person shall not be used as evidence to prove any fact in any
suit or prosecution against such person for any penalty for violation of any law
in relation to fraudulent conveyance of property."
7. 327 S.W.2d at 170.
8. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 120, at 252-57 (1954); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2250, at 276-304 (3d ed. 1940).
9. McCoRMICK, op. cit. supra at 255.
10. Id. at 256.
11. State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N.W. 935 (1902).
12. State v. Zdanowicz, 69 N.J.L. 619, 55 Atl. 743 (Ct. Err. & App. 1903).
13. 8 WIGMORE, Op. cit. srupra note 8, § 2281, at 468.
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state officials, however, in the landmark case of Counselman v. Hitchcock. 4 There
the United States Supreme Court held inadequate a statute,15 purporting to grant
immunity to a witness before a grand jury, that only protected against use of the
testimony as evidence. The Court said it was inadequate because it did not "pre-
vent the use of his testimony to search out other testimony to be used in evidence
against him,"' 8 and then further said: "We are clearly of the opinion that no
statute which leaves the party or witness subject to prosecution after he answers
the criminating question put to him, can have the effect of supplanting the privilege
conferred by the Constitution of the United States."'1
Of the Counselman case, McCormick says: "Surely this was a wrong turning
at a critical point. Perhaps few decisions in history have resulted in freeing more
rascals from punishment. Its soundness may be disputed on several grounds."' 8
Wigmore, after stating that only three shaky cases could have been used as pre-
cedent for the Counselmav decision, says: "It is unfortunate that the Court in
which the latter pronouncement was made should have allied- itself with such
feeble forces."' 9 This, however, is an understandable reaction from quarters that
feel the privilege itself should be at least severely restricted, if not abolished.20
They feel it is long outmoded, an escape route for the guilty, unnecessary for the
innocent, and only "fundamental" because of its close association with other parts
of the Bill of Rights and with liberal fighters against governmental tyranny.
2
'
But courts generally have not agreed with these critics, and after the CounseI-
m n case in most cases involving state statutes that protected only against the
use of the testimony as evidence the courts held the statutes unconstitutional.
22
For instance in Ex parte Carter23 the Missouri Supreme Court held that a witness
before a grand jury could not be compelled to give the names of persons other
than himself whom he had seen gambling because the immunity granted by the
statute24 was inadequate. In expressly following the Counselman case, the Missouri
14. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
15. REv. STAT. § 860 (1875): "No pleading of a party, nor any discovery or
evidence obtained from a party or witness by means of a judicial proceeding in
this or any foreign country, shall be given in evidence, or in any manner used
against him or his property or estate, in any court of the United States, in any
criminal proceeding, or for the enforcement of any penalty or forfeiture ....
16. 142 U.S. 547, 564 (1892).
17. Id. at 585.
18. McCoRMICK, op. cit. supra note 8, § 135, at 285.
19. 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 8, § 2283, at 527-28.
20. MCCORMICK, Op. cit. suspra note 8, § 136, at 288; 8 WIGMORE, Op. Cit.
supra note 8, § 2251, at 304-20.
21. Ibid.
22. McCoRMICK, op. cit. supra note 8, § 135, at 286; and see Annots., 118
A.L.R. 602 (1939), 53 A.L.R.2d 1030 (1957), for a collection of all the cases, and
8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 8, § 2281, note 11, for a collection of all the im-
munity statutes.
23. 166 Mo. 604, 66 S.W. 540 (1902).
24. § 2206, RSMo 1899: "No person shall be incapacitated or excused from
testifying touching any offense committed by another, against any of the provi-
sions relating to gaming, by reason of his having betted or played at any of the
prohibited games or gaming devices, but the testimony which may be given by
such person shall in no case be used against him."
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Supreme Court in Carter said: "No statute which leaves the party or witness sub-
ject to prosecution, after he answers the criminating question put to him, can have
the effect of supplanting the privilege conferred by the Constitution. 25 In so
holding the Court overruled its own prior case of Ex parte Bitskett,26 which had
held the very same statute adequate on essentially the same facts.
Because this "no use of the evidence" type statute was generally being held
unconstitutional when brought before the courts, the legislatures began passing the
"no prosecution" type statute, which requires that the person testify but uncon-
ditionally provides that he shall not be prosecuted with respect to any matter,
transaction, or thing concerning which he testifies or produces evidence, except
perjury in so testifying.27 In the leading case of Brown v. Walker,28 decided by the
United States Supreme Court four years after the Counselman case, the constitu-
tionality of such a statute209 was upheld. In the Brown case the witness had been
called to appear and testify before a grand jury, and it was held that he was bound
to testify, even though it might expose him to personal disgrace80 or prosecution
by some other sovereign.31 The "no prosecution" type statute has been upheld and
the witness compelled to testify in Missouri in State ex inf. Hadley v. Standard
Oil Co.,8 2 and in State ex rel. Jones v. Mallinckrodt Chemical Works.8 Neither of
these cases, however, discussed what is required of an immunity statute before it
may effectively supplant the self-incrimination privilege.
That the privilege against self-incrimination applies to a judgment debtor
being examined as to the location of his hidden assets was not novel to the court
in the Nort. case. The issue had been before the court earlier in State ex rel. Strodt-
man v. Haid,48 and the privilege was held to be applicable. However, the particular
immunity statute involved 5 was not passed upon because it was not brought to
25. Ex parte Carter, supra note 23, at 614, 66 S.W. at 544.
26. 106 Mo. 602, 17 S.W. 753 (1891).
27. See Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 1030, at 1046 (1957).
28. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
29. 27 Stat. 443 (1893), 49 U.S.C. § 46 (1952): "... no person shall be
excused from attending and testifying ...on the ground or for the reason that
the testimony ... required of him, may tend to criminate him or subject him to a
penalty or forfeiture. But no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty
or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which
he may testify .....
30. Brown v. Walker, supra note 28, at 605.
31. Id. at 623.
32. 218 Mo. 1, 116 S.W. 902 (1908). Held valid was § 8989, RSMo 1899 [now
§ 416.400, RSMo 1949J which provides: ". . . no witness shall be permitted to
refuse to answer any question material to the matter in controversy . . . upon the
ground that to ...answer such questions might tend to incriminate him or sub-
ject him to a penalty or forfeiture; but no person shall be subject to prosecution
or to any action for a penalty or a forfeiture on account of any transaction, matter
or thing concerning which he may testify or produce books or papers."
33. 249 Mo. 702, 156 S.W. 967 (1913) (en banc). Held valid was § 10322,
RSMo 1909 [now § 416.230, RSMo 1949J. The text of this statute is identical in
the material parts to the one set out supra note 32.
34. 325 Mo. 1137, 30 S.W.2d 466 (1930).
35. § 491.080, RSMo 1949.
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the attention of the court. In fact, prior to the North case, it had never been before
any appellate court since its passage about one hundred years ago. Faced with the
Carter and Strodtma cases the court in the principal case was bound, it would
seem, by controlling precedent to hold the statute before it invalid. It would also
seem that the only way to get the court to decide otherwise would be to convince
the court that the privilege should not apply because it would greatly hamper a
judgment creditor in collecting on his judgment, that a judgment debtor was de-
serving of no such favored- treatment, and that it would make virtually useless
the examination process provided for by statute. The respondent did in fact make
these contentions, 8 but the court did not discuss them. Presumably it did not
agree, or else felt that the language of the constitution and prior decisions left it
no choice.
The court might very well have felt that the North decision would have no
appreciable effect on creditors in collecting on their judgments or on their examina-
tion of debtors to find assets upon which to levy. This is because the statute had
been suspect for fifty-seven years because of the Carter case, and the self-
incrimination privilege had been deemed applicable to such a situation for twenty-
nine years by virtue of the Strodtman case; yet, so far as is known, no judgment
creditor, other than the one in the Strodtman case, had run into the perils held up
before the court by the respondent. Nor, presumably, had the Missouri legislature
been deluged by unsatisfied judgment creditors demanding a more adequate im-
munity statute, for it is unlikely that the legislature would turn down such a re-
quest if there was evidenced a real need for it. And further, the Missouri legisla-
ture has met since the North case and has failed to pass a new and broader im-
munity statute to replace the one held unconstitutional.
One point remains, and that is that the writer feels that the law in Missouri
on the exact requirements of an immunity statute is less than crystal clear. This
doubt is caused by the language used by the court in the North decision, which is
set out above. The court therein gave two reasons for holding the statute invalid.
It is submitted, however, that the court's language is ambiguous and that there are
at least three possible constructions that can be placed upon it.
First, if the reasons given are to be taken as necessary provisions in a con-
stitutional immunity statute, then would not one that merely provided for "no
use of the testimony as evidence in any criminal prosecution and no use of the
testimony to gain independent evidence" be sufficient? Such a statute, however,
would leave the person testifying open to prosecution by any evidence not garnered
by the tainted testimony. Such a result is not possible under the requirements laid
down by the Carter and Counselmmn cases, for those cases require that the witness
not be subjected to prosecution for any crime divulged. This amounts to a grant
of amnesty or absolute immunity.S7 It is doubtful that the court in the North
decision meant to leave such a loophole, and depart so far from Carter and Counsel-
man.
36. Brief for Respondent, pp. 5-6, State ex rel. North v. Kirtley, supra note 1.
37. 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 8, § 2281, at 467.
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Second, the language utilized by the court could be construed to require that
for constitutionality the statute must include both the hypothesized clause above
plus a "no prosecution" clause. The former requirement would be based on the
North case, and the latter would be based on the Carter case, upon which the court
expressly relied. But if this is the proper construction, then no other jurisdiction
has such a requirement,38 Missouri has no valid immunity statute on the books,
and the Hadley and Jones cases have been overruled. It would clearly seem that
the court did not intend such a result, for the court cited the Hadley and Jones
cases (wherein the statutes involved had only a "no prosecution" clause) with
approval, and also cited several other similar Missouri immunity statutes in the
same manner. 9 Moreover, such a requirement would be demanding a redundancy,
for a "no prosecution" clause is generally interpreted to give amnesty4 0 and thus
covers whatever protection would be given by the writer's hypothesized clause.
Third, and finally, the language of the court could be read as saying that these
reasons go to the invalidity of the particular statute before it, but are not to be
taken as the only necessary provisions of a valid immunity statute. For the statute
did have these two defects-the peril of independent evidence and use in a prosecu-
tion other than one for fraudulently conveying one's property. As stated above a
"no prosecution" type statute does protect against both of these hazards, and the
Carter case said a statute to be valid must be of this type. This would leave the
law in Missouri unchanged, would be in line with the Carter, Counselman, Hadley,
and Jones cases cited by the court, and would leave the several "no prosecution"
type immunity statutes in Missouri unsuspect. It is submitted that this is the
proper interpretation of the North case, and the one that would be most in con-
formity with the intention of the court. Such an interpretation is in keeping with
the majority view in the United States, 41 and, unless one agrees with the criticisms
offered by McCormick and Wigmore, is a sound result. Therefore, while the self-
incrimination privilege applies to the judgment debtor being examined as to the
location of his assets, it would be very easy for the legislature to supplant the
privilege by passing a new immunity statute of the "no prosecution" type.
THOMAS I. OSBORNE
38. See Annot., 118 A.L.R. 602 (1939).
39. §§ 136.100, 73.840, 144.340, 288.230, 386.470, RSMo 1949 and § 330.175,
RSMo 1957 Supp., all having a no prosecution clause. But, strangely, among those
cited with approval was § 129.190, RSMo 1949, which provides: "No person shall
be excused from answering any question .... But no such answer or answers shall
be used or be evidence against such witness in any criminal action, prosecution or
proceeding whatever." See Strom, Witness Immuznity and the 'Missouri Law, 19
Mo. L. REV. 147, at 156 (1954), where the writer says such a statute does not meet
the requirement of the Carter and Counselman cases, and for a general discussion
of immunity statutes.
40. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S.
422 (1956).
41. See the annotations cited supra note 22; see also Strom, supra note 39.
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JURISDICTION-VENUE-MISSOURI-VENUE OF
ACTIONS AGAINST STATE OFFICIALS
State ex rel. Dalton v. Oldhiuml
This was an original proceeding brought at the relation of John M. Dalton,
Attorney General, against the Honorable Woodson Oldham, Judge of the Jasper
County circuit court, to prohibit the latter from exercising jurisdiction over the
person of the relator in an action pending in that court. The action pending in
the circuit court arose under section 125.030,2 which provides for an appeal from
the decision and action of the Attorney General in formulating the official ballot
title of a proposed constitutional amendment and states that any citizen who is
dissatisfied with the title may appeal to "the circuit court," which shall examine
the proposal, hear arguments, and make a final decision. The plaintiff in that
action filed a petition questioning a proposed ballot title in the Jasper County
circuit court, naming the Attorney General as defendant. A copy of the petition
was mailed to the Attorney General, who was also served with a summons in
Cole County.
The court en banc held that section 125.030 did not fix venue of such an
appeal in any county in the state, thereby disposing of respondent's contention
that the statutory phrase "the circuit court" had that effect.8 It was determined
that the general venue statute4 was applicable and that since the Attorney General
neither resided in nor was found in Jasper County, there was no proper venue.
Further, the court said that if, as respondent contended, the appeal provided by
statute is an action in rem to which the general venue statute did not apply,
the statutory appeal contemplates the Attorney General's appearance as a party
and therefore venue would be governed by the rule that, "unless otherwise pro-
vided by statute, the venue of actions against executive heads of departments...
lies generally in the county in which their offices are located and their principal
duties are performed."'5 The court then said that if the appeal is a simple action
in rem, the situs of the res, the ballot title, would be in Cole County, outside
the territorial limits of respondents court, precluding that court's jurisdiction.'
A. Does Lack of Venue Preclude Jurisdiction?
In denying that the Jasper County circuit court had- acquired jurisdiction,
the court upheld the relator's position that under the general venue statute the
appeal did not lie in Jasper County and that there was no service of process
1. 336 S.W.2d 519 (Mo. 1960) (en banc).
2. § 125.030, RSMo 1949.
3. This phrase was interpreted to mean that circuit courts were given general
jurisdiction over this class of cases with reference to the granting or denial of
relief, and the nature of the action.
4. § 508.010, RSMo 1949: "Suits instituted by summons shall, except as
otherwise provided by law, be brought: (1) When the defendant is a resident
of the state, either in the county within which the defendant resides, or in the
county within which the plaintiff resides and the defendant may be found; ... "
5. 336 S.W.2d at 523, quoting from State ex rel. Gardner v. Hall, 282 Mo.
425, 221 S.W. 708 (1920) (en banc).
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on relator sufficient to confer upon the Jasper County circuit 'iourt jurisdiction
over his person.6 This is in conformity with the doctrine that, in actions against
single party defendants, service must be made in accord with proper venue. This
doctrine is based on the requirement that due and effective notice must be given
a defendant that an action has been brought against him, which is the primary
purpose of the service of summons.7 Notice in this connection means more than
the mere communication of knowledge. For, while proper service may be waived
by the appearance of the parties to the merits,8 the party against whom -the action
is directed may insist on service in such a manner as the statute may require.9
Then, although the court may have jurisdiction over the -subject matter of an
action, until jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is obtained by proper
service, it has no authority to proceed 10
Utilizing the rule that requires proper notice before jurisdiction of the person
can be obtained, earlier Missouri decisions have held that a court does not obtain
jurisdiction of the person of a defendant by service of summons upon him out
of the county of venue.1' Perhaps the court's most concrete statement to this
effect was made in Hankins v. Smarr,12 setting aside a judgment on the ground
that it was void for lack of jurisdiction. The original suit had been brought in
Boone County and service was had on defendants, husband and wife, in Gasconade
County. After a discussion of the service statutes, the court said:
Reading these statutes and the venue statute together, do they not mean
that it is essential to jurisdiction, to enter -a personal judgment, for service
of summons to be had upon a defendant or defendants (except when
defendants reside in different counties) in the county (Where plaintiff
resides and defendant is found or Where the defendant resides) in which
the suit is begun?' 8
The practical effect of allowink an individual Missouri resident to demand
that service upon him be made in accordance with proper venue is to give him
a much higher degree of protection than that afforded a non-resident defendant
in an action brought in Missouri. Section 508.010(4)14 provides that a suit againgt
6. 336 S.W.2d at 522.
7. Troyer v. Wood, 96 Mo. 478, 10 S.W. 42 (1888).
8. State ex rel. Ferrocarriles Nacionales de Mexico v. Rutledge, 331 Mo.
1015, 56 S.W.2d 28 (1932); State ex tel. Newell v. Cave, 272 Mo. 653, 199 S.W.
1014 (1917) (en banc); City of St. Louis v. Young, 235 Mo. 63, 138 S.W. 11
(1911); Henneke v. Strack, 101 S.W.2d 743 (K.C. Ct. App. 1937).
9. State ex rel. Minihan v. Aronson, 350 Mo. 309, 165 S.W.2d 404 (1942);
State ex rel. Mueller Baking Co. v. Calvird, 338 Mo. 601, 92 S.W.2d 184 (1936)
(en banc); State ex rel. Davis v. Ellison, 276 Mo. 642, 208 S.W. 439 (1919) (en
banc); State ex rel. Mills Automatic Merchandising Corp. v. Hogan, 232 Mo. App.
291, 103 S.W.2d 495 (St. L. Ct. App. 1937).
10. State ex rel. Minihan v. Aronson, supra note 9.
11. See State ex rel. Bartlett v. McQueen, 361 Mo. 1029, 238 S.W.2d 393
(1951) (en banc); State ex rel. O'Keefe v. Brown, 361 Mo. 618, 235 S.W.2d 304
(1951) (en banc); Yates v. Casteel, 329 Mo. 1101, 49'S.W.2d'68 (1932).
12. 345 Mo. 973, 137 S.W.2d 499 (1940).
13. Id. at 975, 137 S.W.2d at 500.
14. § 508.010(4), RSMo 1949.
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a -non-resident defendant may 'be brought in any county in the state. In regard
to -non-residents using Missouri highways, section 506.210(2)15 further provides
that the non-resident shall be deemed to have appointed the Secretary of State
of Missouri his lawful attorney upon whom may 'be served all process in suits
arising from his use of the highways. Thus non-residents are amenable to suit
in any county in the state, while residents can be validly served in only two
counties.
In order for a court to possess jurisdiction to adjudicate, it must have jurisdic-
tion of the subject matter, jurisdiction -of the res or of the parties, and jurisdiction
to render a particular judgment in a particular case.' 6 The Supreme Court indicated
in the principal case that circuit courts, like the one in Jasper County, had jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter and relief to be granted or denied in this statutory
appeal.17 However, because service with improper venue failed to give the Jasper
County circuit court jurisdiction over the person of the relator, it lacked the
requisite jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.' 8
B. Venue of Actions Against State Officials
The principal case represents an extension of the rule requiring suits against
state officials having their office in Jefferson City to be brought in the Cole County
circuit court. This rule was first announced in State ex rel. Gardner v. Hall, 9
which was an action brought in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis to
quash the records of the State Board of Equalization. The court there gave four
reasons for the rule: (1) this board had no entity except at the state capital;
(2) it is against public policy to force public officials to neglect their duties in
order to travel about the state appearing in court; (3) the board's principal duties
were required to'be performed at the state capital; and (4) it is less expensive
for the state to defend itself in the capital city. The-rule has been extended without
comment to the Secretary of State,20 Director of Revenue, Superintendent of the
Highway Patrol, and the State Tax Commission.21
15. .§ 506.210(2), RSMo 1949.
16. Healer v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 251 S.W.2d 66 (Mo. 1952); State
ex rel. Lambert v. Flynn, 348 Mo. 525, 154 S.W.2d 52 (1941) (en banc); Charles
v. White, 214 Mo. 187, .112 S.W..545 (1908); State ex -rel. Industrial Properties
Inc. v. Weinstein, 306 S.W.2d 634 (St. L. Ct. App. 1957).
17. Cf. Warnecke v. State Tax Comm'n, 340 S.W.2d 615 (Mo. 1960). See
note 21 infra.
18. See note 3 supra.
19. Supra note 5.
20. State ex 'rel. Toberman v. Cook, 365 Mo. 274, 281 S.W.2d 777 (1955) (en
banc).
21. State ex rel. State Tax Comm'n v. Walsh, 315 S.W.2d 830 (Mo. 1958)(en banc). Cf. Warnecke v. State Tax Comm'n, supra note 17, where it was held
the Cole County circuit court had no jurisdiction to review an assessment made by
the St. Louis Board of Equalization on downtown St. Louis business property.
Section 138.470, RSMo 1949, provides an appeal from tax assessments to be in
the manner prescribed 'by the Administrative Procedure and Review Act except
that venue of the review proceedings is in the county where the real property
is located. Section 536.110, RSMo 1949, of the Administrative Procedure and Re-
view Act states that review proceedings may be instituted in the circuit court
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It is submitted that this rule should not be extended to the office of the
Attorney General, 22 who has forty-five assistants and special assistants in twenty-
eight cities throughout the state.23 This fact substantially disposes of all the
reasons given above for the rule. A more equitable arrangement, which could
perhaps be adopted in Missouri, is provided by statute2 ' in California. Section
401.1 of the California Code of Civil Procedure provides:
Wherever it is provided by any law of this State that an action or pro-
ceeding against the State or a department, institution, board, commission,
bureau, officer or other agency thereof shall or may be commenced in,
tried in, or removed to the County of Sacramento, the same may be com-
menced and tried in any city or city and county of this state in which
the Attorney General has an office. 25
Further, an action to obtain the change of a ballot title,28 like other actions
against state officials, may have political ramifications. This rule then forces the
party to bring his action in the city where the opposition is most firmly en-
trenched. Perhaps this in itself suggests the need for a "change of venue."
LYLE H. PE'rrr
of the county of proper venue. Construing these statutes together, the Supreme
Court determined that their effect was to confer exclusive jurisdiction of tax
assessment review on the circuit court of the county in which the real property
is located, which in this case would have been the Circuit Court of the City of
St. Louis.
22. The court does not decide whether the general venue statute applies to
this action if in rem. Should it decide that the appeal provided for in section
125.030 is an action in rem to which the general venue statute applies, the question
arises whether service upon the Attorney General who is found in a county where
the suit is instituted, other than Cole County,.would give that court jurisdiction
over his person? Or would this rule still require the action to be brought in Cole
County?
23. STATE OF MISSOURI OFFICIAL MANUAL, page '79.
24. The following standardized statute is found in the civil procedure codes
of Idaho, Ind., Iowa, Ky., Mich., Minn., Mont., Nev., N.C., Ohio, Okla., Ore., and
Utah: "Actions for the following causes must be brought in the county where the
cause, or some part thereof arose: ... Second, An action against a public officer for
an act done by him in virtue, or under color, of his office or for neglect of his
official duties."
The following states require by statute that actions against state officials and
state agencies, etc., be brought in the county in which the state capital is located:
Ariz., Ark., Miss., Neb., N.M., Tex., Va., and Wis.
25. Discussed in 37 CALIF. L. REv. 102, 105 (1949).
26. Because § 125.030 provides that the circuit court's determination shall
be final, the ruling requiring all appeals to be brought in Cole County vests in
the judge of that circuit court the sole power to determine a ballot title.
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AGISTER'S LIEN-SCOPE OF LIEN-REQUIREMENT OF
POSSESSION
Crouck v. Brookshire-
The plaintiff, pursuant to an oral agreement, pastured the defendant's cattle
at a stipulated price per head. A controversy subsequently arose over the amount
due the plaintiff, and when the defendant attempted to remove the cattle, the
plaintiff demanded payment as a condition precedent to such removal. The de-
fendant insisted that no additional money was owed and refused to pay. The cattle
thus remained on the plaintiff's land for several months until, having no suitable
pasturage remaining, he delivered them to a third party for pasturage and care
on the latter's land, agreeing personally to pay the third party for such care. Upon
the return of the cattle to the plaintiff, this action was commenced to recover for
the pasturage furnished the cattle under the oral agreement and thereafter while
the cattle were being held under lien by the plaintiff and the third party.
The circuit court, relying on a statute according agisters a lien,2 rendered
judgment for the plaintiff for the entire period. On appeal, held, affirmed.
Since the existence of a common law artisan's lien depends upon the enhance-
ment of the value of the bailed goods by the bailee,3 it is clear that the agister
has no such lien, inasmuch as he does not confer any additional value on the
bailed goods as a result of his labor, which consists simply of turning the animals
out to pasture.5 It is thus pertinent to consider whether the lien herein relied upon,
being of statutory creation, 6 should be construed as being more like the lien of
the warehouseman, who can charge storage expenses after retaining possession of
the bailed goods under lien,7 or more like that of the artisan, who cannot charge
for such storage expenses.8 The general theory of the cases decided on this point
seems to be that the artisan cannot charge for storage on the bailed goods while
he is enforcing his lien because the original contract for repairs and the subsequent
implied contract for storage are entirely distinct and separate, while the warehouse-
man may make such additional charges since they are not inconsistent with the
purpose of the original agreement.9 Applying this test to the agistment situation,
it would seem that since the pasturage expenses incurred while animals are held
1. 330 S.W.2d 592 (K.C. Ct. App. 1959).
2. § 430.150, RSMo 1949, provides that every person who keeps, boards, or
trains any horse, mule, or other animal shall have a lien on such animal for the
amount due therefor.
3. Scarfe v. Morgan, 4 Mees. & W. 270, 150 Eng. Rep. 1430 (1838).
4. Tandy v. Elmore-Cooper Live Stock Comm'n Co., 113 Mo. App. 409, 87
S.W. 614 (K.C. Ct. App. 1905); Stone v. Kelley & Son, 59 Mo. App. 214 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1894).
5. Jackson v. Cummins, 5 Mees. & W. 342, 151 Eng. Rep. 145 (1839).
6. See note 2 supra.
7. Reindenbach v. Tuch, 88 N.Y. Supp. 366 (Sup. Ct. 1904); Devereux v.
Fleming, 53 Fed. 401 (C.C.D.S.C. 1892).
8. See Mack Motor Truck Corp. v. Wolfe, 303 S.W.2d 697 (St. L. Ct. App.
1957), wherein numerous authorities sustaining this principle are cited.
9. Devereux v. Fleming, supra note 7.
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under lien are entirely consistent with the expenses involved. in the original con-
tract, their recovery should be allowed. Furthermore, it appears that an analysis
of the meaning and theory of agistment' ° will find it to be more analogous to the
situation presented in the storage cases than to that involved in the repair cases,
inasmuch as the underlying purpose of agistment is the boarding and protection
of the bailed animals, and not the improvement or direct enhancement of the value
of them. It is true that the pasturage of animals works to enhance their value, but
such enhancement does not appear to be synonomous with that involved in the
artisan situation, 1" since it is not due directly to labor expended by the bailee. In
any event, the enhancement of value would seem to be only a secondary result of
the pasturage, which is, in the first instance, required for the mere preservation of
the animals. Missouri has apparently followed this reasoning, although it appears
that the courts have never before been required to state it in a case identical on
facts to the instant one.12
Most of the reported cases dealing with the problem of relinquishment of
possession by a lienor are concerned with the situation where possession is re-de-
livered to the bailor, and usually hold that where such re-delivery is for a limited
purpose and without the intention to waive the lien, the lien is not lost.'3 These
decisions are thus at variance with the general rule that any voluntary relinquish-
ment of possession by the lienor terminates the lien for all time.'4 This conflict
seemingly can be resolved under proper factual situations in at least two ways: (1)
by holding that the deliveree is an agent of the bailee, thereby making the pos-
session of the deliveree that of the bailee, and consequently permitting the bailee
to retain his lien right;' 5 or (2) by holding that due to the very nature of the par-
ticular bailment, it is within the contemplation of the parties at the time of the
original agreement that the bailee might under certain circumstances be forced to
10. See Bramlette v. Titus, 70 Nev. 305, 267 P.2d 620 (1954), wherein agist-
ment is defined as the particular kind of bailment under which a man, for con-
sideration, takes in cattle to graze and pasture on his land.
11. See State ex rel. Pleasant v. City of Ottawa, 84 Kan. 100, 113 Pac. 391
(1911), defining an artisan as one employed in an industrial or mechanical art or
trade.
12. Cf. Cotton v. Gorrell, 180 Mo. App. 118, 167 S.W. 1187 (K.C. Ct. App.
1914); Powers v. Botts, 63 Mo. App. 285 (K.C. Ct. App. 1895).
13. See, e.g., Storey v. Patton, 61 Mo. App. 12 (St. L. Ct. App. 1895); State
ex rel. Vette v. Shevlin, 23 Mo. App. 598 (St. L. Ct. App. 1886); Smeed v. Stock-
men's Loan Co., 48 Idaho 643, 284 Pac. 559 (1930); Gould v. Hill, 43 Idaho 93,
251 Pac. 167 (1926); Johanns v. Ficke, 224 N.Y. 513, 121 N.E. 358 (1918); Becker
v. Brown, 65 Neb. 264, 91 N.W. 178 (1902); Welsh v. Barnes, 5 N.D. 277, 65
N.W. 675 (1895).
14. Rosencranz v. Swofford Bros. Dry Goods Co., 175 Mo. 518, 75 S.W. 445
(1903); Loader v. Bank of Idana, 113 Kan. 718, 216 Pac. 264 (1923); Ames v.
Palmer, 42 Me. 197, 66 Am. Dec. 271 (1856); Holly v. Huggeford, 25 Mass. (8
Pick.) 73, 19 Am. Dec. 303 (1829).
15. See Pacific Aviation Co. v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 64 Ore. 530, 128 Pac. 438
(1912); Jaquith v. American Express Co., 60 N.H. 61 (1880); Western Transp.
Co. v. Barber, 56 N.Y. 544 (1874).
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sub-bail the delivered goods in order to protect the bailor's interest, 6 This reason-
ing has apparently found support in other cases involving agistment,17 and would
appear to be a correct result since the proper pasturage of animals in such situ-
ations can in no way be said to be of little importance. The opinion on this point
in the instant case is somewhat unsatisfactory, however, because the court appar-
ently assumes that it made no difference whether plaintiff lost possession when he
delivered the cattle to a third party. Missouri courts have apparently never
directly passed on the question, but it nevertheless can be expected that they will
adhere to the result in the principal case in the future inasmuch as it would seem
to be compatible with logic and the public interest.
J. KELLY POOL
MALPRACTICE-EXTENDED DUTY OF A PHYSICIAN
Steele v. Woods1
Plaintiff sued the defendant for malpractice to recover damages for failure
to exercise reasonable skill and judgment during and after an operation for
varicose veins. After the operation in question, the inner circulation did not
return to the plaintiff's legs. The plaintiff suffered great pain during her 69 days
in the hospital, and much of that period was spent under the influence of drugs.
As a result of the lack of circulation in plaintiff's legs, gangrene set in. The
infection caused ulcers to form on her legs and the skin to fall away from her
toes. Later, under the care of another physician, it was necessary to amputate
seven of her toes.
Expert testimony submitted by the defendant during the trial explained the
plaintiff's condition as resulting from spasms of the blood vessels which caused
constriction of the veins and arteries leading to. the failure of circulation. There
are two remedies for such a condition: a sympathectomy, which is the cutting
of the nerves that control the constricting muscles; and second, a paravertebral
block, which is the injection of novocain or some other anesthetic agent into the
nerves. Such treatment would relieve the spasm and commence circulation. The
plaintiff received neither of the treatments.
The defendant alleged the plaintiff was contributorily negligent in refusing
to let the defendant perform the paravertebral block when it became apparently
necessary after the operation. Plaintiff, on the other hand, alleged that defendant
was negligent in failing to advise the plaintiff of the need for such a paravertebral
block. Thus the questions were left to the jury as to whether the paravertebral
block had been offered, and, if so, whether it had been refused. The jury returned
16. See Willard v. Whinfield, 2 Kan. App. 53, 43 Pac. 314 (1896); Hoover v.
Epler, 52 Pa. 522 (1866); Tillotson v. Delfelder, 40 Wyo. 283, 276 Pac. 935 (1929),
where the court said that the lienor was certainly under no obligation to let the
cattle starve simply because he had no suitable pasturage left.
17. Willard v. Whinfield and Tillotson v. Delfelder, supra note 16.
1. 327 S.W.2d 187 (Mo. 1959).
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a verdict for the plaintiff. This was set aside by the trial court, which sustained
the defendant's motion for judgment after verdict and motion for new trial. On
appeal, held, reversed concerning the motion for judgment after verdict and affirmed
concerning the motion for the new trial.
Defendant's main contention for having his motion for judgment after verdict
sustained was that the plaintiff had not -brought forth probative evidence to
show that the defendant had not offered the paravertebral block. The plaintiff's
testimony, in response to the question whether the defendant had discussed the
block with her, was to the effect that she could not remember and had no rec-
ollection. The defendant submitted that such evidence had no probative force.
The court answered the question by going into an aspect of the case overlooked
by both attorneys, i.e., whether the condition of the patient created a further
duty on the part of the physician to advise someone else of the need for further
treatment.
The court recognized the general rule that the physician is required to use
that degree of care which is commonly exercised by the ordinarily skillful and
prudent physician or surgeon engaged in similar conditions,2 and that this duty
is also extended to post operational care.$ Even if the physician's personal atten-
tion is no longer necessary, he still has a duty to furnish the patient with instruc-
tions.' It has been generally accepted, however, that if the doctor advises the
patient, and the patient, being an adult and in possession of her faculties, refuses,
then the doctor has fulfilled the burden of his duty.5
In Fausette v. Grim,0 an obvious exception is stated. There the patient was
suffering from post operative insanity and the doctor called her relatives and told
them she was ready to go home from the hospital. The patient soon thereafter
became violently insane. The court held that the jury might find the physician
negligent in failing to inform the relatives of the care the patient needed. Steele
v. Woods seems to extend the duty of the physician to a further degree than
Fausette v. Grim. In Fausette all parties seemed to agree that the patient was
suffering from a type of insanity, and because of the insanity the duty of the
doctor was extended to inform the relatives. The principal case seems to go even
further in saying that if the doctor, under the surrounding circumstances, could
reasonably believe that other factors were weighing on the patient's mind (pain
and drugs) so that she could not make a competent evaluation of her problem,
then the physician has a duty to "advise the husband or other members of the
family who are available and competent to advise with or speak for the patient
or take other steps to bring understanding of the need home to the plaintiff."
This extension of the duty of the physician does not seem to place an
2. Williams v. Chamberlain, 316 S.W.2d 505 (Mo. 1958).
3. Nash v. Royster, 189 N.C. 408, 127 S.E. 356 (1925); Sibert v. Boger,
260 S.W.2d 569 (Mo. 1953); Reed v. Laughlin, 332 Mo. 424, 58 S.W.2d 440 (1933).
4. Vann v. Harden, 187 Va. 555, 47 S.E.2d 314 (1948).
5. 70 CJ.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 51c (1948).
6. 193 Mo. App. 585, 186 S.W. 1177 (K.C. Ct. App. 1916).
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undue burden upon him. The scope of the professional obligation of the highly
skilled members of the medical profession to their patients should include this
further effort to advise of the need for medical treatment, when it is reasonable
to assume that the patient does not understand the seriousness of her problem.
PAUL JACKSON RICE
MILITARY LAW-MINOR'S ENLISTMENT VOID-COURT-MARTIAL
JURISDICTION
United States v. Overto 1
The statutes provide that male persons not less than seventeen years of age
may be enlisted in the Regular Army but that persons under eighteen shall not be
enlisted without written parental consent.2 The statutes also provide that soldiers
under eighteen who enlisted without written parental consent shall be discharged
upon parental application.3 When the accused was less than seventeen he enlisted
in the Army, without parental consent, by using his older brother's name and
school record. While he was still under seventeen, the accused requested that the
records be changed to reflect his true name. After reaching seventeen, the accused
absented himself without leave. Ten months thereafter, while accused was in con-
finement awaiting trial for the unauthorized absence, his mother applied for his
discharge. Two weeks later and a day after he had been found guilty by a special
court-martial of the absence without leave and sentenced to six month's confine-
ment, accused refused to obey an order. On his plea of guilty to a charge of willful
disobedience, he was found guilty by a general court-martial and sentenced to
further confinement. The conviction of willful disobedience was affirmed by a
board of review in the Office of The Judge Advocate General but reversed by the
Court of Military Appeals, one judge dissenting, on the ground that accused was
not subject to military law. The court held that the original enlistment was
absolutely void and that the action of the accused in remaining voluntarily in the
Army after reaching seventeen did not effect a constructive enlistment because his
willingness to serve was conditional upon the approval of his application for change
of the record of his name and because his mother's application for his discharge
prevented a constructive enlistment.
The federal civil courts, in habeas corpus proceedings, have been in conflict as
to the effect of the enlistment of persons below the minimum statutory age for en-
listment with parental consent. Some take the view that these enlistments are not
1. 9 U.S.C.M.A. 684, 26 C.M.R. 464 (1958) (Latimer, J., dissenting).
2. 10 U.S.C. § 3256 (1958). Prior to 1947, the governing statutes were REv.
STAT. §§ 1116-1118 (1875), providing that recruits shall be between the ages of 18
and 35, that no person under 21 shall be enlisted without written consent of par-
ents or guardian, and that no minor under the age of 16 shall be enlisted.
3. 10 U.S.C. § 3816 (1958).
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void but merely voidable.- The weight of authority, however, seems to be, that,
these underage enlistments are void.5 Prior to 1951 the highest tribunals directly
reviewing Army court-martial cases, The Judge Advocate General and the boards
of review, consistently treated such enlistments as merely voidable. 6 The Court of
Military Appeals decided in 1957 that they were absolutely void,7 and the present
decision adheres to that view.
The authorities have been unanimous in holding that an enlistment without
parental consent effected after the individual has reached the minimum statutory
age for enlistment with such consent is merely voidable at the option of the par-
ents.8 Parents, however, are not entitled to avoid the enlistment while the individ-
ual is being held for trial or under sentence by court-martial. 9 There is some au-
thority to the contrary,' 0 but this has been said to be bad law." The Judge Advo-
cate General and the boards of review have always held that until formal discharge
4. In re Cosenow, 37 Fed. 668 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1889); Ex parte Rock, 171
Fed. 240 (C.C.E.D. Ohio 1909); United States ex rel. Lazarus v. Brown, 242 Fed.
983 (ED. Pa. 1917).
5. Commonwealth v. Harrison, 11 Mass. 63 (1814); In re Miller, 114 Fed.
838 (5th Cir. 1902), cert. denied, 186 U.S. 486 (1902); Hoskins v. Pell, 239 Fed.
279 (5th Cir. 1917); Barrett v. Looney, 158 F. Supp. 224 (D. Kan. 1957), affirmed
per curiam, 252 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1958).
6. C.M. 338668, Charles H. O'Daniel, 6 B.R. & J.C. 243, 255-256 (1949);
C.M. 235143, Jack D. McKinney, 21 B.R. 309, 316 (1943); C.M. 187175, Thomas
A. Genuso, 1 B.R. 7, 11-12 (1929); WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AN PRECEDENTS 551
(2d ed. 1920), and cases cited therein; DIG. Ors. JAG Enlistment IA (1912), and
cases cited therein in note 2; DIG. Ops. JAG § 359(3) (1912-1940).
7. United States v. Blanton, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 664, 23 C.M.R. 128 (1957).
8. In re Morrissey, 137 U.S. 157 (1890); In re Lessard, 134 Fed. 305
(C.C.D.N.H. 1905); United States ex rel. Laikund v. Williford, 220 Fed. 291 (2d
ir. 1915); Allen v. Wilkinson, 129 F. Supp. 73 (M.D. Pa. 1955); Ex parte Dostal,
243 Fed. 664 (N.D. Ohio 1917); Ex parte Beaver, 271 Fed. 493 (N.D. Ohio 1921);
Rx parte Lewkowitz, 163 Fed. 646 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908); Ex parte Rush, 246 Fed.
172 (M.D. Ala. 1917); Hoskins v. Dickerson, 239 Fed. 275 (5th Cir. 1917); Ex
parte Dunakin, 202 Fed. 290 (E.D. Ky. 1913); In re Scott, 144 Fed. 79 (9th Cir.
1906); United States v. Reaves, 126 Fed. 127 (5th Cir. 1903); In re Kaufman, 41
Fed. 876 (C.C.D. Md. 1890); In re Dowd, 90 Fed. 718 (N.D. Cal. 1898); Dilling-
ham v. Booker, 163 Fed. 696 (4th Cir. 1908); Ex parte Avery, 235 Fed. 248
(E.D.N.C. 1916); In re Zimmerman, 30 Fed. 176 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887); In re
Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890).
9. Barrett v. Looney, supra note 5; Ex parte Hubbard, 182 Fed. 76 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1910); In re Miller, supra note 5; Ex parte Foley, 243 Fed. 470 (W.D. Ky.
1917); In re Lessard, United States ex rel. Laikund v. Williford, Allen v. Wilkin-
son, Ex parte Dostal, Ex parte Beaver, Lx parte Lewkowitz, Ex parte Rush,
Hoskins v. Dickerson, Ex parte Dunakin, In re Scott, United States v. Reaves,
It re Kaufman, In re Dowd, Dillingham v. Booker, Ex parte Avery, In re Zimmer-
man, supra note 8; Lx parte Rock, In re Cosenow, supra note 4; WINTHROP, op. cit.
supra note 6. See also Fratcher, Review by th~e Civil Courts of judgments of Fed-
eral Military Tribunals, 10 OHIo ST. L.J. 271, 280 (1949), and cases cited therein.
10. Ex parte Lisk, 145 Fed. 860 (E.D. Va. 1906); In re. Baker, 23 Fed. 30
(C.C.D.R.I. 1885); In re Chapman, 37 Fed. 327 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1889); Ex parte
Houghton, 129 Fed. 239 (C.C.D. Me. 1904).
11. WINTHROP, op. cit. supra note 6.
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a minor is subject to court-martial jurisdiction if he commits an offense.1 2 More-
over, it has been held that one who enlists while below the minimum statutory
age for enlistment with parental consent but remains in the service after attaining
that age, accepting the benefits of military status, effects a constructive enlist-
ment, so that his status is the same as if he had enlisted initially after attaining that
age,' 8 and the fact that his original enlistment was faulty is not fatal to military
jurisdiction over him. 14
The present decision throws grave doubt upon the continued application of
these well-established rules. It appears to permit a person eligible for enlistment
to remain in the service, accepting food, lodging, clothing and pay for an extended
period, without effecting a constructive enlistment, merely because he has made
an application for an unimportant change in the record of his enlistment. It also
appears to permit a parent to wait until his son is in confinement for a serious
offense and then prevent his punishment for that offense by applying for his dis-
charge.
The 1957 decision of the Court of Military Appeals'5 and the present decision
create a class of persons who are actually in uniform, serving as soldiers, but who
are legally civilians because their age is less than that shown on the records. In
time of war this is likely to be a large class and its existence is seriously disadvanta-
geous both to the military service and to the members of the class themselves.
The disadvantage to the service of having men who appear to be soldiers but who,
unknown to their superiors, are not punishable for refusal to fight, is obvious. The
individuals themselves, especially those who behave well, are also injured. They
cannot count service in this status for purposes of retirement and veteran's bene-
fits.;6 They would not be entitled to hospitalization and medical care for service-
incurred wounds and disease. They may be liable to repay the pay and allowances
which they receive and, probably, to reimburse the government for their food,
lodging, clothing and transportation. It may even be that, if captured by the
enemy, they are not entitled to the status of prisoners of war, i.e., they may be
"civilians." And civilians who conduct hostilities may be shot by their captors' 7
JAMEs D. SIcKAL
12. C.M. 235143, Jack D. McKinney, supra note 6, at 316; DIG. Ops. JAG
EvIistment IA (1912), and cases cited therein.
13. x parte Hubbard, supra note 9; Bx parte Dunakin, In re Kaufman, Dil-
lingham v. Booker, supra note 8; Hoskins v. Pell, supra note 5.
14. C.M. 338668, Charles H. O'Daniel, supra note 6; Barrett v. Looney, supra
note 5.
15. United States v. Blanton, supra note 7.
16. Op. Comp. Gen., B-142704, 39 DEcs. CoMP. GEN. - (1960).
17. See 2 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 80 (6th ed. 1944), referring to
Art. I of the Hague Convention of 1907.
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